110 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
110 lines
3.6 KiB
Go
package middleware
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import (
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"context"
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"log"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"aggios-app/backend/internal/config"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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)
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type contextKey string
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const UserIDKey contextKey = "userID"
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const TenantIDKey contextKey = "tenantID"
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// Auth validates JWT tokens
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func Auth(cfg *config.Config) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
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return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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authHeader := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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if authHeader == "" {
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http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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bearerToken := strings.Split(authHeader, " ")
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if len(bearerToken) != 2 || bearerToken[0] != "Bearer" {
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http.Error(w, "Invalid token format", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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token, err := jwt.Parse(bearerToken[1], func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
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return []byte(cfg.JWT.Secret), nil
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})
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if err != nil || !token.Valid {
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http.Error(w, "Invalid token", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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claims, ok := token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
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if !ok {
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http.Error(w, "Invalid token claims", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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// Verificar se user_id existe e é do tipo correto
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userIDClaim, ok := claims["user_id"]
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if !ok || userIDClaim == nil {
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http.Error(w, "Missing user_id in token", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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userID, ok := userIDClaim.(string)
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if !ok {
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http.Error(w, "Invalid user_id format in token", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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// tenant_id pode ser nil para SuperAdmin
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var tenantIDFromJWT string
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if tenantIDClaim, ok := claims["tenant_id"]; ok && tenantIDClaim != nil {
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tenantIDFromJWT, _ = tenantIDClaim.(string)
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}
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// VALIDAÇÃO DE SEGURANÇA: Verificar user_type para impedir clientes de acessarem rotas de agência
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if userTypeClaim, ok := claims["user_type"]; ok && userTypeClaim != nil {
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userType, _ := userTypeClaim.(string)
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if userType == "customer" {
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log.Printf("❌ CUSTOMER ACCESS BLOCKED: Customer %s tried to access agency route %s", userID, r.RequestURI)
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http.Error(w, "Forbidden: Customers cannot access agency routes", http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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}
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// VALIDAÇÃO DE SEGURANÇA: Verificar se o tenant_id do JWT corresponde ao subdomínio acessado
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// Pegar o tenant_id do contexto (detectado pelo TenantDetector middleware ANTES deste)
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tenantIDFromContext := ""
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if ctxTenantID := r.Context().Value(TenantIDKey); ctxTenantID != nil {
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tenantIDFromContext, _ = ctxTenantID.(string)
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}
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log.Printf("🔐 AUTH VALIDATION: JWT tenant=%s | Context tenant=%s | Path=%s",
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tenantIDFromJWT, tenantIDFromContext, r.RequestURI)
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// Se o usuário não é SuperAdmin (tem tenant_id) e está acessando uma agência (subdomain detectado)
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if tenantIDFromJWT != "" && tenantIDFromContext != "" {
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// Validar se o tenant_id do JWT corresponde ao tenant detectado
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if tenantIDFromJWT != tenantIDFromContext {
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log.Printf("❌ CROSS-TENANT ACCESS BLOCKED: User from tenant %s tried to access tenant %s",
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tenantIDFromJWT, tenantIDFromContext)
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http.Error(w, "Forbidden: You don't have access to this tenant", http.StatusForbidden)
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return
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}
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log.Printf("✅ TENANT VALIDATION PASSED: %s", tenantIDFromJWT)
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}
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// Preservar TODOS os valores do contexto anterior (incluindo o tenantID do TenantDetector)
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ctx := r.Context()
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, UserIDKey, userID)
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// Só sobrescrever o TenantIDKey se vier do JWT (para não perder o do TenantDetector)
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if tenantIDFromJWT != "" {
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ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, TenantIDKey, tenantIDFromJWT)
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}
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next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
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})
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}
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} |